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I. INTRODUCTION

Diversity--of a cultural, economic, religious, and political kind--exists
not only among nation-states and in the sources and interpretation of international law, but also among the group of commentators who study the
interactions of transborder actors and institutions.' For example, sociologists
interested in the global community seek to identify emerging entities and
activities and to elaborate conceptual models that explain the new differentiations within the traditional pattern. Some of them have a mounting interest
in the fashioning of transborder commercial justice by international arbitrators and private arbitral institutions.3 Who are these new players? How did
they acquire their mandate? Further, how effective are they in performing
their mission?
International relations scholars4 bring the perspective of historical distance to bear upon contemporary world events. Knowledge of the past can be
*

Thomas E. Carbonneau is the Samuel P. Orlando Distinguished Professor of Law at the

Penn State Dickinson School of Law.
1.
The participants in the conference reflect a diversity of approaches to the study of the
international system. Symposium, Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 845 (2004). An emphasis was placed, it seems, upon political
history and sociology. Legal considerations and power relationships among States were present but
did not dominate. The conference did not relate directly to legal doctrine, but rather studied institutions within the world government and patterns of behavior within the world community. In short,
there were many different "takes" on trade and commerce among nations and other sovereign relationships.
2.
Saskia Sassen, Ralph Lewis Professor of Sociology, The University of Chicago; Karel
Wellens, Professor of International Law, Catholic University of Nijmegan; Gunther Teubner, Professor of Private Law and Legal Sociology, University of Frankfurt.
3.
See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

(1996);

Louise Barrington, Arbitral Women: A Study of Women in InternationalCommercialArbitration,in
THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE

229 (Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell ed., 1997); Ottoarndt

Glossner, SociologicalAspectsofInternationalCommercialArbitration,in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 143 (Jan C. Schultsz & Albert Jan Van Den Berg eds., 1982).
4.
Stephen Krasner, Professor of International Relations, Stanford University; Daniel Philpott, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Notre Dame.
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instrumental to understanding current events because present-day behaviors
often repeat by-gone follies. The U.S. policy in Vietnam from the late 1950s
until the fall of Saigon in 1975' is an eloquent testimonial to the fact that the
passage of time makes nations and their leaders forgetful and foolhardy.
Their vanity pushes them to misinterpret the cycle of events as a singular
occasion
to achieve a new national destiny and personal historic immortal6
ity.

In addition to sociologists and international relations scholars, lawyers
also annotate transborder events and examine the significance of sovereign
relationships. Public international lawyers,7 in fact, are preoccupied with
political conduct among States. Some public internationalists are particularly
interested in the exchanges that occur among sovereigns within international
organizations. For many of them, legal doctrine does not stand on its own.
The true purpose of legal regulation is to integrate the dynamics of global
governmental relations into the framework of established public agencies.
Bureaucratization can civilize these relationships and permit States to see
beyond the pressure of immediate events. The ambition of these academic
5.
SeeWalterJ. Boyne, The FallofSaigon,83:4An FoRCEMAG. (April2000), availableat
http://www.afa.org/magazine/apri12000/0400saigon.asp; R. FORD, ET AL., GRANTA 15: THE FALL
OF SAIGON (1985).
6.
Then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and other members of President Johnson's
cabinet appear to have ignored the evident lessons that proceeded from the history of Vietnam. The
French experience in Vietnam and the fall of Dien Bien Phu should have alerted these advisers to
the peril of military involvement in that country. See generally Bruce Kennedy, Dien Bien Phu:
1954 Battle Changed Vietnam's History, available at http://www.cnn.com/SPEClALS/cold.war/
episodes/1 I/spotlight (last visited Sept. 4, 2004) ("The fall of Dien Bien Phu shocked France and
brought an end to French Indochina."); Battle of Dien Bien Phu, available at http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle ofDienBien-Phu (last visited Sept. 4, 2004).
7.
The distinction between public and private international lawyers reflects the differentiation made in traditional civil law systems between lawyers who specialize in public law matters and
those who work with private law. Public international lawyers focus upon diplomacy, treaties, and
international agencies. Their concerns center upon the conduct of States as political entities that
seek to advance their national self-interest. They look to organizations such as the World Court
(ICJ) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) to help build consensus on various issues of policymaking. In contrast, private international lawyers look to the impact of national laws and courts
upon private transborder actors and events. Traditionally, much of their work involves choice-of-law
and the conflict of laws-and, inevitably, forum-shopping. Currently, such lawyers chiefly counsel
parties about the risks and opportunities of the international marketplace and assist them in dealing
with the perplexities of international litigation before national courts or arbitral tribunals. Generally,
the clients are private persons, not States or State agencies. The applicable law usually is the tort or
contract law of a particular State, not a treaty or a regulatory edict from an international agency. For
more on this distinction, see David Kennedy, New Approaches to ComparativeLaw: Comparativism and InternationalGovernance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 582-85 (1997) (stating that it is
"characteristic of public international lawyers" to "combin[e] ... formalism and fusion with a national political agenda" and that "[p]rivate international lawyers tend to see themselves in
relationship to the projects of private parties in a sphere outside government, regulated only exceptionally").
8.
Indeed, this is the entire purpose of the WTO and its dispute settlement body (DSB).
Rather than have trade wars and protectionism, the WTO attempts to have States agree to basic
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diplomats is to influence the conduct of foreign relations and to anticipate
the direction of policy in the shifting sands of sovereign self-interest.
International politics, however, can be difficult to harness. Sovereign
prerogative can result in policies that exclusively seek momentary advantage.
Their creators take comfort in convenience. Higher, longer range objectives
often recede to the background because of their risk, cost, and greater difficulty. 9 The volume and intensity of worldwide clashes constantly fragment
and reconfigure the international community. The headwind of perpetual
discord makes it difficult to reach the eye of the storm. Even when the eye is
reached, a greater ferocity lies just beyond the other wall. Unbending, obdurate, and usually invisible, sovereign self-interest seeps into every pore of the
international community,'0 often rendering regulatory goals illusory and
principles and practices on world trade. The agreement, negotiated among sovereigns, is generally
intended to foster free and unrestricted trade. The DSB was created to address and sanction violations of the trade agreement. The procedure respects the sovereign character of the participants, but
establishes an effective and relatively efficient mechanism for enforcing agreed-upon terms. For an
extensive discussion of the WTO and the DSB, see BERNARD M. HOEKMAN, ET AL., DEVELOPMENT, TRADE, AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK (2002); World Trade Organization: Dispute
Settlement: Appellate Body, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/
appellateibody_e.htm (last visited on Sept. 4, 2004); World Trade Organization: Appellate Body
Annual Report for 2003, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/news04_e/news04_
e.htm#ab_annual-report (released May 7, 2004).
9.
At the United Nations the discussion of the invasion of Iraq between the United States
and the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other, demonstrated the
possible dichotomy in policy approach. The French position against the invasion was based upon
the long-standing French attitude, which originated during the presidency of Charles DeGaulle, that
France should act as a rival of the United States and thereby set an example for the assertion of
national autonomy in the clash of the atomic titans. The French position on Iraq also was substantially motivated by the lucrative contracts, estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars, that
French enterprises had with and through the Saddam regime. The German position may have also
been motivated by longer range diplomatic concerns, but it reflected the substantial opposition
among the German population to another Gulf war and the pressures of electoral politics. German
companies also had large contracts with the former Iraqi government and private Iraqi enterprises.
For a discussion of these matters, see Faye Bowers, Driving Forces in War-Wary Nations; the
Stances of France,Germany, Russia,and China are Colored by Economic andNational Interests,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 25, 2003, at 3 (stating that "Germany, too, is owed billions by Iraq
in foreign debt"); Patrice M. Jones, U.S. Successes in War Undercut Chirac'sStance: Business,
Party Leaders Critical,CHI. T IB., Apr. 12, 2003, at 3 (stating that "[b]oth France and Russia have
significant economic footholds in Iraq" and reporting that "French companies built Baghdad's water
system and much of its phone network, and oil corporations such as France's TotalFinaElf have
long ties with Iraq").
10.
In the preceding note, French and German opposition to entering a military coalition
against Iraq was described as motivated in part by large financial concerns and electoral politics. See
text, supra note 9. These foundational elements of the French and German position were generally
known at the time of the UN Security Council debate, but were never emphasized or discussed in
the North American press. The bogus allegation that U.S. policy was devised for the purpose of
confiscating Iraqi oil received much greater media attention. Be that as it may, self-interests of a
callous economic kind seem to motivate surreptitiously the content of State policies. For a discussion of the French and German positions on Iraq, see Marcus Walker, et al., Why Greed Isn't
Driving U.S. or Europe Over Iraq, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2003, at A6.
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making the grandiose designs of public law theory the stuff of fiction." The
realpolitikdominates global relations. The use of force is more likely to be
the instrument of sovereign policy than inspired diplomacy. Even with international organizations, like the WTO, or multilateral regional treaty
frameworks, like NAFTA, 2 the surrender of sovereignty is subject to endless
reconsideration and re-evaluation. When compared to domestic law, international law-making is plagued by the rule of force and the absolute supremacy

of national sovereignty.
Private international lawyers 3 embrace less lofty ambitions: their task is
to protect clients from the risks of the international marketplace. 4 Although

sovereignty remains a factor in this setting," it is not a black hole that eats up
every morsel of legal civilization. The debate surrounding competing political positions-e.g., on the costs of disarmament,16 on environmental policy, 7
and on the disproportionate use of resources by wealthy countries' 8-is substantially attenuated and can even be ignored in the swirl of "boundaryless

11.
The discourse in which public international lawyers engage is often more aspirational
than realistic. Their texts also are filled--often times-with the conceptualism of political theorists.
The discussion often becomes a doctrinaire statement about acceptable values within the singular
polity that is being envisioned. This type of elucidation is likely to have a very modest impact upon
the content of policy. See BURNS WESTON, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER (3d

ed. 1997); Anthony D'Amato, HumanRights as a Part of Customary InternationalLaw: A Pleafor
Change of Paradigms,25 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 47 (1995/1996).
12.
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art.
2203, 32 I.L.M. 605, 702 (1993); see also NAFTA Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107
Stat. 2057 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3473 (1993)); COMMERCIAL MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE NAFTA COUNTRIES (Luiz M. Diaz & Nancy A. Oretskin eds., 1999); Henri C.

Alvarez, ArbitrationUnder the NorthAmerican Free TradeAgreement, 16 ARB. INT'L 393 (2000);
Daniel M. Price, Observationson ChapterEleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

421 (2000); R. Edward Ishmael Jr., North American Free Trade Agreement: Dispute Resolution
Procedures,2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 455 (1991).

13.
See, e.g., text, supra note 7 (discussing the distinction between public and private international lawyers).
14.
See generally GEORGE A. BERMANN, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL
(2003); RICHARD H. KREINDLER, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION: A BASIC PRIMER (1998); RUSSELL

(4th ed.
2003).
15.
See Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,1332,1391,
1441, 1602-1611.
J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING

16.

See generally THOMAS GRAHAM JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF

(2002).
17.
See Robert Andalman, The Enforcement of CERCLA JudgmentsAgainst ForeignDefendants, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 61, 80 (1992) ("[L]egal relationships between public bodies and private
individuals often cannot be neatly characterized as 'public' or 'private' in the way those terms have
been used in international law.... By pressing for enforcement of cost recovery actions, through
test cases or by treaty efforts, the United States can advance its own environmental policy, as well as
the international law of enforcement of judgments.").
18.
See generally The UN Conference on Environment and Development, UN Doc.
A/CONF. 151/26,31 I.L.M. 18744 (1992).
ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
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transactions." Events do not need to be "spun"' 9 to encourage perceptions
favorable to national self-interest. The privatistesaim to make global commercial transactions possible by providing for the international protection of
private legal rights. The globalization of commerce, seen by most nationstates as beneficial to their self-interest,' ° cannot take place without a workable system of transborder adjudication.2'
II.

THE FOIBLES OF MUNICIPAL ADJUDICATION

Municipal legal solutions to the problems of transborder commercial
litigation are approximative at best. Processing international commercial
claims through national courts leads to a decentralized system that is byzantine
both in its structure and operation, evincing the profound limitations of legal
methodology.22 It is a system that is created and operated by and which,
therefore, works for the lawyers and judges-not the clients who must avail
themselves of it and pay its costs. 23 In this regard, the fragmentation and
19.
In the political culture of false contrition, "spinning" an event or set of circumstances
represents an attempt to distort the reality of the situation sufficiently to achieve an interpretation of
the occurrence that is advantageous to the spinner's side. The truth or objective character of the
circumstance is seen merely as an obstacle to achieving the desired advantage. This strategy fits into
the manipulation of the media, which in turn manipulates the political process for copy. The general
view is that, if your version of events is stated incessantly and repeated by the media, it becomes the
truth of the matter. "Talking points" therefore, eventually define veracity in political discourse. The
adversarialization of the political process and the media, as well as the additional conversion of the
media to entertainment, make it nearly impossible to know how or why policy is formulated. Consumerism and careerism in higher and professional education has had a similar corrupting impact
upon academic standards in U.S. universities. The end goals of power monopolies, advertising revenues, and indecently high salaries for managers appear to be the exclusive objective; all other values
are subordinated. It is the same adversarialism that paralyzes the operation of the judicial process.
20.
Privatistes is a term that French academic lawyers use to distinguish between public and
private law lawyers. Those lawyers who study torts, contracts, commerce, conflict of laws, and the
relationships among private individuals are privatistes.Public law lawyers focus upon administrative law, criminal law, and other forms of public regulation. See text supra note 7 (discussing the
distinction between private and public law lawyers). On States' interest in global commerce, see
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (Eric E. Bergsten et al. eds., 1975); see also INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS 'JUDICIALIZATION' AND UNIFORMITY

(Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower, eds., 1994).
21.
See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Ballad of TransborderArbitration,56 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 773, 775-77 (2002).
22.

See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MELTING THE

(1989).
23.
During a lecture at Tulane University School of Law in 1988, a justice of the Australian
Supreme Court remarked that she was astounded that the legal profession had for so long pulled the
wool over everyone's eyes in terms of the provision of dispute resolution services. Lawyers and
judges, in effect, transform the litigants' dispute and turmoil into arcane and elaborate jurisdictional,
procedural, evidentiary, and interpretative problems. The resolution of the dispute has ultimately
little to do with the parties' fundamental conflict or with the plight of the human personality that it
translates. Moreover, the proceedings can be protracted and subject to inordinate delay. The costs of
litigation can be staggering. The marketplace would hardly tolerate the provision of such a service if
LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1-11
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disunity--or diversity---of the international community are as fully apparent
in the private as in the public transborder sector. Diversity is as unworkable
before national courts as it is in public international organizations.2
25

inefficient.
Transborder commercial litigation is complex, difficult, and
It portrays the law at its theoretical best and at its practical worst.2 6The ethic
of pragmatism succumbs to sectarianism. The utility of litigation is corroded
by the antics of forum-shopping. After the remedial strategies have been
exhausted, judgments are likely to conflict and to be rendered ineffective.
The variability of national legal systems28 and the quest to find litigious advantage confound the functionality of the process. Further, the amounts of
time and money expended to reach an inconclusive outcome is likely to have
been enormous. An abysmal outcome is the result simply because parts or
aspects of the transaction crossed national boundaries.29
The problems with transborder litigation begin at the outset of the process. Private transborder lawsuits are riddled by jurisdictional issues.3
Whether a court has a lawful basis for asserting its authority over a dispute
and the disputants is generally determined by reference to the court's national law. Lawsuits involving the same parties and circumstances brought in

it were not imposed coercively by law. Judicial litigation does not usually improve the clients' lives
or situation, but rather provides them eventually with finality at the price of exorbitant transaction
costs. See CARBONNEAU, supra note 22, at 11-13.
24.
Political differences certainly are difficult to reconcile. They involve historical assumptions about culture, morality, and social organization that are embedded in the fabric of a national
community. It is easy to forgo reconciliation when such matters are involved, especially when they
carry an economic and domestic political price tag. Bringing suit against foreign parties in their
courts, third-party courts, or in domestic courts involves the same confrontation of basic dispositions. The legal profession, the judiciary, the trial system, and the applicable law bear the same
name, but differ radically in substance. For a discussion of these issues, see RICHARD A. DANNER &
MARIE-LOUISE BERNAL, INTRODUCTION TO FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEMS (1994).
25.
See generally KREINDLER, supra note 14.
26.
Transborder litigation uses the analytic and adversarial characteristics of legal thinking to
create a system of litigation that responds fully to all the aspects of processing international claims
before national courts. The system is so complex that it can be resorted to only for large claims, if at
all; further, it is so protective of the litigants' rights that it becomes dysfunctional. The inconclusive
character of enforceability renders the system ultimately of little utility.
27.
See Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum-Shopping,Domesticand International,63 TuL. L. REV.
553 (1989).
28.
On foreign and comparative law, see H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE
WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW (2000); HENRY P. DE VRIES, CIVIL LAW AND THE ANGLo-AMERICAN LAWYER (1976).
29.
The only real distinction between transborder and standard litigation is that the underlying transaction involves contact with a foreign jurisdiction. This factor sets in motion an entire
system of procedure to deal with what are perceived to be exceptional lawsuits. If domestic courts
would restrain their jurisdiction to rule, apply solely local law to resolve disputes, and use adaptive
evidentiary standards, it would reduce the complexity of the process and of its operation.
30.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); In re Union
Carbide (Bhopal), 634 F Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Bulova Watch Co. v. Hattori, 508 F. Supp.
1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
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different countries probably will all go forward because national laws are not
coordinated on the question of court jurisdiction.3' These varied national
laws provide for inconsistent results on the basis of different rationales. Even
in those rare instances in which national prescriptions converge, the convergence is achieved on the basis of countervailing interpretations of the law.32
The standard situation: parallel proceedings in different jurisdictions with an
exchange of anti-suit injunctions" between the two venues. U.S. courts and
courts from other common law jurisdictions benefit from the additional possibility of resorting to theforum non conveniens doctrine, 4 under which they
may refuse-for both practical and policy reasons-to exercise their jurisdictional authority. Civil law courts, however, cannot abstain from exercising
their authority because the law establishes their power to adjudicate. The
hapless U.S. national and California resident who goes to Tokyo, Japan to
appear in commercial spots and is involved in a car accident there will get
lost between the two trial systems as well as in the translation. Each affected
venue will seek to impose its own brand of justice upon the case and will
thereby contribute to a situation in which no useful result is reached.
Much more lies in wait after the jurisdictional preliminaries. The choice
of a governing law can trigger interminable debates between advocates. Legal systems have concocted recondite frameworks for choosing (or not) an
applicable law to the litigation. After examining a legion of localization
factors, if the court concludes that it must rule pursuant to a foreign law, the
problem of proving or establishing that law arises.37 This circumstance ne-

cessitates the hiring of experts-at least one for each side in the U.S.
system 38-to discover what the law provides and to explain the findings to a
31.
See SHOICHI KIDANA ET AL., OUTLINE OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 261 (1985);
Thomas E. Carbonneau, The FrenchExequaturProceeding:The ExorbitantJurisdictionalRules of
Article 14 and 15 (Code Civil) As Obstaclesto the Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in France,2
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 307 (1979).
32.
See KIDANA, supra note 3 1, at 261.

33.
On anti-suit injunctions, see BERMANN, supra note 14, at 110.
34.
See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981); see also Rosato, RestoringJustice to the Doctrine ofForum Non Conveniens ForForeign Plaintiffs Who Sue U.S. Corporationsin the FederalCourts, 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L.
169 (1986).
35.
On the jurisdiction of civil law courts, see DE VRIES, supra note 28.
36.
See FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (1993); Kurt
Lipstein & Istram Szaszy, InterpersonalConflict of Laws, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 10 (Kurt Lipstein ed., 1971) (discussing choice of law).
37.
See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 976 (1982); Corp. Salvadorena de Calzado v. Injection Footwear Corp., 533 F. Supp. 290
(S.D. Fla. 1982); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1; N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4511 (2004); CAL. EVID. CODE § 452
(2004).
38.
In civil law systems, the court appoints a single expert who eventually submits a report to
the court to which the parties can responded. The procedure is known as l'expertisejudiciaire.The
expert acts for a public, non-adversarial purpose. See generally Robert F. Taylor, A Comparative
Study of Expert Testimony in France andthe UnitedStates: PhilosophicalUnderpinnings,History,
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judge (or, worse yet, a jury) that has little or no training in foreign law, and
no real desire to learn it. Given the obstacles, the process--once culminated-usually ends, directly or indirectly, in the application of the only law
that the presiding judge (or jury) knows and understands; the local law. 9
As the process evolves, the problem of identifying, gathering, and admitting evidence emerges. When transborder litigation is conducted in the
United States especially, the gathering and admission of evidence creates
special problems. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the federal
courts to command the production of evidence4 and the Rules of Evidence
impose relatively stringent standards for the admissibility of evidence.4' Orders for the production of evidence and subpoenas for testimony or
documents sent to foreign jurisdictions often are met with local resistance
and blocking statutes41 that express the foreign State's unwillingness to compromise or surrender• its
41 national legal sovereignty. For example, although
the Hague conventions were drafted to enhance transborder service of process and evidence-gathering, the Hague mechanism has been of very limited
utility." Despite their stated goals, the conventions fail even to approximate
the promised reconciliation of common law and civil law trial differences. 5
The bureaucratization of transborder service of process and evidencegathering through national central authorities46 has not increased accessibility; there is now, in fact, greater delay, more political positioning, and less
control over the quality of the evidence. Local obfuscation has not been
Practice,and Procedure,31 TEx. INT'L L.J. 181 (1996). The use of experts in the U.S. process is
dominated by the adversarial ethic, resulting in experts on both sides canceling each other out.
39.
It appears unrealistic to assume that an entire education in foreign and comparative law
can be achieved in the setting of an ordinary litigation. The linguistic problems themselves create a
nearly insurmountable threshold barrier. Judges are not any more disposed than any other U.S.
trained lawyer to understanding Asian, religion-based, or civil law legal systems. It is difficult to
believe that sophisticated decision-makers could readily switch gears.
40.
FED. R. Civ. P. 28.
41.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
42.
On blocking statutes, see KREINDLER, supra note 14, at 148-149, 183-184. See also
Socitd Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
43.
Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965,20 U.S.T. 361,658 U.N.T.S. 163, (entered into force Feb. 10,
1969) [hereinafter Convention on the Service Abroad]; Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, 23 U.S.T. 2555 (1973) [hereinafter
Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad]; see Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (examining the purpose behind the Hague conventions).
44.
See Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. Iowa, 482 U.S. 522
(1987); see also Russell J. Weintraub, The Needfor Awareness of InternationalStandards When
ConstruingMultilateralConventions:the Arbitration,Evidence, and Service Conventions,28 Tax.
INT'L L.J. 441 (1993).
45.
See, e.g., Convention On The Taking Of Evidence Abroad, supra note 43, arts. 3(h-i), 9,
15, 21(c-d), 23.
46.
See Convention on the Service Abroad, supra note 43, at art. 2; Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad, supra note 43, at art. 2.
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eliminated; it simply has been given another means of expression.47 Moreover, the federal rules do not guarantee the admissibility of evidence
gathered abroad under the Hague framework,4' nor do they warrant that foreign courts will assist U.S. parties in collecting usable evidence abroad.49
The enormous differences in trial procedures among legal systems 0
create even more difficulties. Adversarial trials and inquisitorial trials differ
markedly, as they represent different religions of law. Each's proponents see
their approach as uniquely and exclusively correct. The role of the judge, the
function of experts, the means of establishing a record, the importance of oral
testimony, the function of party representation, and the availability of appeal
are all dissimilar.5 Therefore, the measure ofjustice-the protection of rights
and the availability of remedies-varies from national jurisdiction to national
jurisdiction. The choice of forum can often give effect to or foreclose the
parties' cause of action." Given the disparities between national legal systems,
the lack of uniform trial procedures, and the competition between litigating
47.
A central authority has six months to respond to a letter of request and can, at the end of
that period, find some discrepancy with the request and ask that the document be resubmitted in
proper form. The Hague system was established by diplomats; its primary objective was to achieve
a compromise between antagonistic positions on matters of service and evidence. On the one hand,
civil law jurisdictions found the pursuit of discovery on their territory by private U.S. attorneys to be
offensive "fishing expeditions." On the other, U.S. litigators needed to secure "usable" evidence
abroad, i.e., depositions that were produced under oath pursuant to adversarial examination and
party representation. The proceedings also needed to yield a verbatim transcription of the testimony.
The drafters of the convention sought to achieve a reconciliation of the competing interests by giving the State that received the request maximum flexibility. This flexibility essentially rendered the
convention useless.
48.
According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the federal courts need only give
circumspect validity to evidence obtained abroad pursuant to a letter of request: "Evidence obtained
in response to a letter rogatory need not be excluded merely for the reason that it is not a verbatim
transcript or that the testimony was not taken under oath or for any similar departure from the requirements for depositions taken within the United States under these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 28.
49.
See id., at 4(e), 4(i), 28(b), 29; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1782, 1783.
50.
On these procedural differences, see, e.g., GLENN, supra note 28.
51.
See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, GlobalizationofArbitralProcedure,36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1313 (2003); Catherine Kessedjian, La modelisationprocddurale,
in LA MONDtALISATION Du DROIT (Eric Loquin & Catherine Kessedjian eds., 2000); Pierre Mayer, Lepouvoir des
arbitresde riglerla procedure,une analyse comparative des systdmes de civil law et de common
law, REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 163 (1995).
52.
The circumstances of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), illustrate
the point well. The case involved a Houston, Texas company that had entered into a towing contract
with a German company to transport an oil rig to the Mediterranean Sea. Id. at 2. The German company had submitted the low bid. Id. The contract, however, contained an exculpatory clause in
addition to a forum selection clause that provided that disputes would be resolved by a court in
London. Id. at 2-3. Rough seas in the Gulf of Mexico damaged the rig and caused the tower to seek
safe harbor in Tampa, Florida. Id. at 3. The damages were calculated at $3.5 million. Id. at 3-4.
Enforcing the poorly written forum-selection clause meant that English law would apply. Id. English law, unlike its American counterpart, favored the use of exculpatory clauses and held that they
were enforceable. See id. at 8 n.8. By ordering the parties to litigate in London pursuant to the forum-selection clause, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the merits of the case: it gave the German
towing company an immunity to liability that was not available under U.S. law. See id. at 19.
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parties, international litigators resort to forum-shopping strategies to
neutralize and damage the other side. The attempt to maximize the client's
position by going to a favorable forum, however, generally results in fleeting
advantage. Nevertheless, both parties can and do engage in the warfare, even
as their respective efforts cancel each other out.
It should be noted that transborder litigation practice is not unique to the
United States.53 Although few, if any, States have enacted legislation to regulate international litigation,14 many countries have acted as venues for such
litigation. Generally, courts apply the provisions of domestic law to this form
of litigation.55 Therefore, not only is international litigation commonplace,
but it also is plagued universally by the same problems. Foreign judicial systems, in fact, may be less hospitable than their U.S. counterpart. Delays in
foreign jurisdictions may be much more considerable then before U.S.

53.
U.S. courts have had a significant role in this type of litigation since the 1960s because of
the economic strength of the United States and the multi-national expansion of U.S. companies. The
days of rulings like the one in In re Romero, 56 Misc. 319, 107 N.Y.S. 621 (1907), in which the
court steadfastly refused to engage in any international judicial assistance for a Mexican court in
order to protect the interests of a U.S. national, have passed. The court therein stated that "[t]he
doctrine is well established that the laws of a foreign country will not be enforced, if such enforcement will contravene the settled policy of the forum or be prejudicial to the interests of its own
citizens." 107 N.Y.S. at 622. See also In re Letters Rogatory Out of First Civil Court of City of Mexico, 261 Fed. 652, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) ("It is undesirable, in my opinion, to aid a process which
may require residents of this district to submit to the burden of defending foreign suits brought in
distant countries, where they have no property, or as an alternative to suffer a personal judgment by
default, which will be enforceable against them personally whenever they may enter the foreign
territory.").
The days of nearly messianic exuberance also have passed. In the 1960s, U.S. courts would
readily assert jurisdiction over transborder litigation that had very little connection to the United
States or its laws, such as when the litigating parties were foreign nationals and the events transpired abroad. Given the global reach of U.S. economic activity, American courts began to assume
an international judicial function. The policy made a highly sophisticated litigation process available on a worldwide basis and dedicated U.S. judicial time and resources to the stabilization of the
international marketplace. It also had the consequence of exporting American justice standards to
other parts of the world. See TACA Int'l Airlines v. Rolls-Royce of Eng., Ltd., 204 N.E.2d 329
(N.Y. 1965); Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 854 (N.Y. 1967) (in his dissent,
Judge Breitel criticized the court's cavalier approach to the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign
litigation).
Finally, the era of judicial economy provided the impetus for a more sober policy on the assertion of U.S. judicial jurisdiction in matters of transborder litigation. The cost of servicing the world
had become prohibitive and dispute resolution exclusively on U.S. terms problematic. See Delagi v.
Volkswagenwerk AG, 278 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1972); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
For adescription of the law of transborder litigation in other countries, see Jenny S. Martinez,
Towards an InternationalJudicialSystem, 56 STAN. L. REV. 429 (2003) (discussing the interplay of
national laws in the international arena).
54.
See Carbonneau, supra note 31, at 316.
55.
See KIDANA, supra note 31; Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d
661 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
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courts. 56 In some countries, the national supreme court may have original
jurisdiction in some aspects of foreign litigation-a circumstance that can
prolong the procedures inordinately.57 Also, juridical quality may vary from
country to country; the influence of external political or religious beliefs may
as well. Finally, corruption and bribery can also become considerations.58
The final phase of transborder litigation involves the enforcement of foreign court judgments. In many ways, the "back end" issue of enforcement
restates the "front end" problem of jurisdiction. The enforceability of the
court's ruling, obviously critical to the successful resolution of the dispute,
can depend upon whether the court of rendition had proper jurisdiction initially. 9 Moreover, it is imperative that the judgment be enforceable in a
jurisdiction in which the defendant has sufficient assets to satisfy the terms
of the foreign court decision. Some legal systems impose a "reciprocity"
threshold 6 before a foreign court judgment can be considered for enforcement. In effect, the reciprocity requirement asks whether courts in the
country of rendition enforce the requested State's court judgments and other
juridical acts. The concept of reciprocity can be as difficult to define as the
notion of the reasonable person.6' It can involve assessing the foreign courts'
general policy on enforcement or looking to whether they give effect to specific types of judgments. In effect, what constitutes the requisite quid pro
quo is a matter of judicial interpretation, judgment, and choice in the circumstances of each case.
Once reciprocity is established, foreign judgments are evaluated on the
basis of various factors, e.g., whether the court of rendition had proper domestic and international jurisdiction under the law of the requested State;
whether the judgment debtor had adequate notice of the proceeding and a
reasonable opportunity to defend; whether the judgment is free of fraud; and
whether enforcement violates the requested State's public policy. 62 A merits
56.
Despite their caseloads, U.S. courts are very efficient from a comparative perspective and
benefit from a sophisticated infrastructure and generous public funding. For a discussion of the
operation of courts in other countries, see DANNER & BERNAL, supra note 24; Maria Dakolias,
CourtPerformanceAround the World: a ComparativePerspective,2 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J.
87 (1999).
57.
This is the case in some Latin American countries. See Felipe Sdez Garcia, The Nature of
Judicial Reform in Latin America and Some Strategic Considerations, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1267 (1998).
58.
See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DOING BUSINESS ABROAD, available at
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/cba/176.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
59.
See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894); Munzer c. Dame Jacoby-Munzer, Cass.
Ie civ., Jan. 7, 1964, J.C.P. 1964, II, 13590.
60.
See, e.g., § 328 ZPO (German code of civil procedure). But see Hunt v. BP Exploration
Co., Ltd., 492 F Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
61.
See KIDANA, supra note 31, at 268.
62.
See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, supranote 59; Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 783 (2004); Linda J. Silberman, Enforcement and
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review or revision aufond is generally excluded. The exclusion of a merits
review represents an advancement in transborder legal cooperation and civilization. In some jurisdictions, enforcement can be resisted if the court of
rendition applied the wrong choice-of-law or if the outcome is not available
under the law of the requested State.64Although judgments from like-minded
or aligned States could be deemed to be presumptively enforceable, 65 except
in the EU setting, there is no multilateral treaty on jurisdiction and the enforcement of foreign judgments.66 The question is so divisive on cultural and
systemic grounds that even the United States and the United Kingdom have
been unable to agree to a bilateral framework (despite serious diplomatic
attempts to do so).67 Therefore, not only can the results of litigation in different venues conflict, but they may also be enforceable only in the place of
rendition-and not where the judgment debtor has assets.
In the final analysis, even though their professional mission is less august, private international lawyers do not negotiate any more effectively than
their public law counterparts the white water rapids of diversity within the
international community. In general, transborder commercial litigation before national courts produces unsatisfactory results. Enormous sums can be
expended and clients left without an enforceable solution. Professional fees
in such circumstances can be difficult to collect. Therefore, politics in the
public sector and conflicts in the private sector render the accomplishment of
a transborder rule of law extremely difficult. Diversity engenders disharmony and insecurity. In each sector, the actors perceive the mere tolerance of
differences as a surrender of national authority and, as a consequence, a defeat. Even complete dysfunctionality is preferable to defeat. The key to
transborder success, however, is precisely the sublimation of national legal
and political authority in a higher design that mandates a relinquishment of
national sovereignty as a first and fundamental step to resolution.

Recognition of Foreign CountryJudgments in the UnitedStates, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LITIGATION & ARBITRATION (John Fellas ed., 2004).
63.
See Silberman, supra note 62.
64.
See, e.g., Munzer c. Dame Jacoby-Munzer, Cass. le civ., Jan. 7, 1964, J.C.P. 1964,11,
13590.
65.
See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d. Cir. 1971).
66.
See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil &
Commercial Matters, Oct. 30, 1999, Hague Conference on Private International Law, available at
http://www.hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36e.html (last visited August 28, 2004).
67.
Andreas E Lowenfeld & Linda J. Silberman, A Difficult ChallengefortheAL: Hereinof
Foreign Country Judgments, an InternationalTreaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635,
635-36 (2000) (discussing the draft convention).
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THE ARBITRAL SOLUTION

Arbitration appears to have tamed segments of the diverse international
environment. It has given expression to the need to establish a workable adjudicatory process for transborder commerce." In some respects, arbitration
has achieved the monumental inroad of reducing the impact of sovereignty
on international relations. It has done so indirectly by enticing States to participate in international arbitral proceedings to resolve the commercial
conflicts that proceed from foreign investment and the State's marketplace
activities. 61 More directly, the NAFTA arbitral framework allows aggrieved
individuals to sue directly a member State and also allows arbitrators to assess the transborder commercial liability of the domestic conduct of member
States. 70 NAFTA arbitration, therefore, embodies a truly restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity from suit and execution 7' and gives the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) commercial activities exception its most
meaningful expression.72
68.
(2004).
69.

See, e.g.,

THOMAS

E. CARBONNEAU,

THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION,

337

See BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, INVESTISSEMENT ETRANGERS ET ARBITRAGE ENTRE ETATS

ET PERSONNES PRIVEES

(1969);

INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES AND

GOVERNMENTS (Gerald Aksen & Robert B. Von Mehren, eds., 1982); M. SORNARAJAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES (2000); Emmanuel Gaillard, L'arbitragesur le
fondement des traitisde protectiondes investissements,REV. ARB. 853 (2003); Horacio A. Grigera

Na6n, The Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Private Parties-An Overview
from the Perspective of the ICC, 1 J. WORLD INVEST. 59 (2000). See also Phillipe Leboulanger,
L'arbitrageinternationalNord-Sud, in ETUDES OFFERTES A PIERRE BELLET 323 (1991).
70.
See Charles H. Brower I, Investor-State Disputes Under NAFTA: a Tale of Fearand
Equilibrium, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 43 (2001); Charles H. Brower II, Investor-State Disputes Under
NAFTA: The Empire Strikes Back, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 43 (2001); Patrick Dumberry, The
NAFTA Investment Dispute Settlement Mechanism-a Review of the Latest Case-Law, 2 J. OF
WORLD INVESTMENT 151 (2001); Cheri D. Eklund, A Primeron theArbitrationofNAFTA Chapter
Eleven Investor-State Disputes, J. INT'L ARB. Dec. 1994, at 135; Patrick G. Foy, Effectiveness of
NAFTA's ChapterElevenInvestor-StateArbitrationProcedures,18(l) ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 44 (2003); Cdline L6vesque, Investor-StateArbitration UnderNAFTA Chapter11:
What Lies Beneath JurisdictionalChallenges, 17 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVEST. L.J. 320 (2002);
Daniel Posin, The Multi-FacetedInvestmentArbitrationRules ofNAFTA, 13 WORLDARB. & MED.
REP. 13 (2002); J. C. Thomas, Investor-StateArbitration UnderNAFTA Chapter11, 37 CANADIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 99 (1999); Todd Weiler, NAFTA Investment Arbitrationand the Growth of International Economic Law, 36 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 405 (2002).
71.
See, e.g., K. I. VIBHUTE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND STATE IMMUNITY (1999); Leon E. Trakman, ArbitratingInvestment Disputes Under theNAFTA, 18 J. INT'L
ARB. 385 (2001). But see Jacques Werner, The Frailtyof the ArbitralProcess in Cases Involving
AuthoritarianStates-And OtherPitfalls ofInvestmentArbitration,1J. WORLD INVEST. 321 (2000).
72.
See, e.g., Tara A. O'Brien, The Validity of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Defense in
Suits Under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 7
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 321 (1983-84); Richard J. Oparil, Waiver of SovereignImmunity in the United
States and Great Britain by an ArbitrationAgreement, 3 J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 61 (1986); Amy L.
Rothstein, Recognizing and EnforcingArbitralAgreements andAwardsAgainst ForeignStates: The
MathiasAmendments to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Title 9, 1 EMORY J. INT'L DISP.
RESOL. 101 (1986).
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States have also moderated their sovereign prerogatives by ratifying the
New York Arbitration Convention73 and the ICSID Convention.74 Both instruments are popular among the members of the international community
and represent a strong commitment to enforce international arbitral awards

and to make governments accountable for their transborder commercial conduct. In some respects, the need to develop world trade and commerce-to
spread the benefits of economic development more widely-has broadened
national perspectives and enabled an international common interest to triumph over the insularity of diversity. The achievement is not without its
difficulties and exceptions, but it is a process that has survived economic
downturns and other negative pressures. It appears to be firmly in place. Participation in transborder commerce is perceived as an effective means of
stimulating local economic activity and achieving domestic prosperity. Arbitration is essential to the conduct of world business. Therefore, the
acceptance of, and recourse to arbitration together comprise a necessary precondition to entry into trans border commerce."'
It is inaccurate and unfair to criticize international arbitration as a
"Northern" mechanism that silences or muffles the diversity of the world
community. Transborder arbitration has reconciled some of the geo-political
and systemic differences and erected a workable and truly global system of
adjudication. International commercial arbitration began as a European process; at that stage in its development, it reflected the adjudicatory
methodology of continental civil law systems. It eventually became the basis
for the conduct of business between North America and Europe and a battle73.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, openedfor
signatureJune 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (codified at 9 U.S.C.A. 201-208 [1970])
[hereinafter New York Arbitration Convention]. The literature on the New York Arbitration Convention is voluminous. See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION-AN INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 2939 (Hans Smit & Vratislav Pechota eds., 3d ed. 2004). The basic references include: THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION (Girgio Gaja & Kenneth R. Simmonds eds., 1979); ALBERT JAN VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958: TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION (1981). See also UNITED NATIONS, ENFORCING ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE
NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.2 (1999); IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF
THE NEW YORK CONVENTION (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1999). Recent articles include: Alan
Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 213 (1996);
David P. Steward, National Enforcement of ArbitralAwards Under Treaties and Conventions, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNI-

163 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1994).
The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
74.
of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,575 U.N.T.S. 159. See Aron Broches, The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 136
RECUEIL DE COURS (REC. COURS) 333 (1972); Georges R. Delaume, La convention pour le rkglement des difftrends rilatifs aux investissements entre etats et ressortissantsd'autres etats, 93 J.
DROIT INT'L 26 (1966); Michael M. Moore, InternationalArbitrationBetween States and Foreign
Investors-The World Bank Convention, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1359 (1966).
75.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 68.
FORMITY?
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ground between the American adversarial trial process and the European
approach to litigation.16 During the cold war era, it also made East-West
trade possible through East-West arbitrations conducted in Sweden.7 7 It is
now a springboard for global commerce in Latin America, 8 Asia,79 and-

increasingly-in Africa. 0
Arbitration both embraces and transforms global diversity when it
fosters uniform law-making by international organizations, States, and
arbitrators. It is beyond cavil that there is-both emerged and emerging-a
world law of arbitration." The two international instruments referred to
76.

See Giorgio Bernini, CulturalNeutrality:A PrerequisitetoArbitralJustice, 10 MICH. J.

INT'L L. 39 (1989); Christian Borris, Common Law and Civil Law: FundamentalDifferences and
Their Impact on Arbitration,60 ARB.-J. CHARTERED INST. ARB. 78 (1994); Christian Borris, Rec-

onciliationof Conflicts Between Common Law and Civil Law Principlesin the ArbitrationProcess,
in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry
Alexander K. Rider eds., 1999); Bernardo M. Cremades, Overcoming the Clash of Legal Cultures:
the Role of Interactive Arbitration, 14 ARB. INT'L 157 (1998); Charles Carabiber, L'dvolution de
l'arbitragecommercialinternational,99 REC. COURS 119 (1960-61); Thomas E. Carbonneau, The
Balladof TransborderArbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 773 (2002); Michael Kerr, Concord and
Conflict in InternationalArbitration,13 ARB. INT'L 121 (1997); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Harmonizing Cultural Differences: An Arbitrator's Experience, in IFCAI, FIFTH BIENNAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION CONFERENCE 118 (1999); Lucy Reed & Jonathan Sutcliffe, The 'Americanization'of
InternationalCommercialArbitration?,16 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 37 (2001).
77.
See Ulf Franke, InternationalArbitration in Sweden, 76 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 166
(1982); Lars A. E. Hjemer, Sweden: the Stockholm ArbitrationInstitute, in HANDBOOK OF INSTITUTIONAL ARBITRATION 187 (Ernest J. Cohn et al. eds., 1977); Ulf HoImback, Commercial
Arbitration in Sweden, 6 INT'L TRADE L. & PRAC. 491 (1980); WernerMelis, East-WestA rbitration,
47 ARB.-J. CHARTERED INST. ARB. 84 (1981); Ulf Nordenson, The ArbitralProceedingsin InternationalArbitration in Sweden, 1984 Y.B. SwED. & INT'L ARB. 19. See generallyLARS HEUMANN,
ARBITRATION LAW OF SWEDEN: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2003).
78.
See ALEJANDRO M. GARRO, LATIN AMERICAN LAW: ARBITRATION LAW & PRACTICE
(2001); Sergio Bermudes & Carlos Lins, The FutureofArbitrationin Brazil and in Latin America,
in INTERNATIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE LCIA CENTENARY CONFERENCE 125 (Martin Hunter et al. eds., 1995); David Fraser, Arbitration in Latin America: an
Overview, 5 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 60 (2002); Robert Layton, Changing Attitudes Toward Dispute
Resolution in Latin America, 10 J. INT'L ARB. 123 (1993); Fernando Mantilla-Serrano, Major
Trends in InternationalCommercialArbitration in Latin America, 17 J. INT'L ARB. 139 (2000).
79.
See INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN ASIA (Philip J. McConnaughay &
Thomas B. Ginsburg eds., 2002); Neil Kaplan, Arbitration in Asia: Developments andCrises, 19 J.
INT'L ARB. 245 (2002); Jessica L. Su, EnforcementofArbitralAwards: a Survey of SelectedAsian
Jurisdictions,3 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 179 (2000).
80.
See AMAZU A. Asouzu, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND AFRICAN
STATES: PRACTICE, PARTICIPATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2001); ARBITRATION IN
AFRICA (Eugene Cotran & Austin Amissah eds., 1996); Roland Amoussou-Guenou, The Evolution
ofArbitrationLaws in FrancophoneAfrica, 64 ARB.-J. CHARTERED INST. ARB. 62 (1998); Amazu
A. Asouzu, Arbitration in Africa: Agendafor Reform, ARB. & DISP. RES. L.J. (1997); G. Kenfack
Douajni, OHBLA Arbitration, 17 J. INT'L ARB. 127 (2000).
81.
See IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION,
INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992); Fabien G61inas, Arbitrationand the Challengeof Globalization,
17 J. INT'L ARB. 117 (2000); Catherine Kessedjian, The Global Context: is GlobalHarmonization
Needed?, in ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS OR STATE COURTS: WHO MUST DEFER TO WHOM? 101 (Pierre

A. Karrer ed., 2001); Lloyd, Globalizationand Harmonizationof the Basic Notions in International

1198

Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw

[Vol. 25:1183

earlier attest to an international consensus surrounding arbitration. 2 The
New York Arbitration Convention, in particular, symbolizes the State
recognition of the transborder utility and necessity of arbitration. The3
Convention supplies the critical element of enforceability to the process.
The Convention is reinforced by other UNCITRAL instruments in the form
of a Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 5 (Model Law) and
Model Rules of Arbitration.8" The Model Law is particularly significant
because it embodies those principles of arbitration law that worldwide
experts believed were the core elements of the law of arbitration. The Model
Law establishes the basic substantive rules for regulating arbitration while
the Model Rules supply the framework for the conduct of an arbitral trial.
UNCITRAL has recently undertaken to collect and catalogue all of the
judicial opinions on the New York Arbitration Convention. This
information will allow for more accurate predictions as to enforcement in
specific jurisdictions. It will also permit the depth of the world consensus on
arbitration to be gauged with greater precision. In addition, the Model Law

Arbitration, 13 INT'L CONSTR. L. REV. 144 (1997); Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Mondialisation,
jurisdiction,arbitrage:vers des rkgles d'applicationsemi-ndcessaires?92 REVUE CRITIQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (REV. CRIT. DR. INT'L PRIV.) 1 (2003); Jemej Sekolec, The Needfor
Modern andHarmonized Regimefor InternationalArbitration,1CROATIAN ARB. Y.B. 27 (1994);
Henry P. de Vries, InternationalCommercial Arbitration: a ContractualSubstitute for National
Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982).
82.
See text, supra notes 73 and 74.
83.
See generally DOMENICO Di PIETRO & MARTIN PLATTE, ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958 (2001); Susan Choi, Judicial
Enforcement ofArbitrationAwards Underthe ICSIDand New York Conventions,28 N.YU. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 175 (1995-96).
84.
See PIETER SANDERS, THE WORK OF UNCITRAL ON ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION
(2001).
85.

See ARON BROCHES, COMMENTARY ON THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNA(1990); ISAAK DORE, THE UNCITRAL FRAMEWORK FOR
ARBITRATION IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE (1993); Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Introductionto the
UNCITRAL Model Law on InternationalArbitration, in CARSWELL'S HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 512 (Babak Barin ed., 1999); Susan Cohen, International
TIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

CommercialArbitration:a ComparativeAnalysis of the UnitedStates System and the UNCITRAL
Model Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 703 (1986); Gerold Herrmann, 13 Years Experience with the
UNCITRAL Model Law on InternationalCommercialArbitration,in DERECHO MERCANTIL CONTEMPORANEO 67 (Ana Piaggi & Luis Estoup eds., 2001); Gerold Herrmann, The UNCITRAL
Arbitration Law: a Good Model of a Model Law, 3 UNIFORM L. REV. 483 (1998).
86.
See John P. Dietz, Introduction:Development of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 27
AM. J. COMP. L. 449 (1979); John D. Franchini, InternationalArbitrationUnder the UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules: a ContractualProvisionfor Improvement, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2223 (1994);
Peiter Sanders, Commentary on UNCITRALArbitration Rules, 2 YB. COM. ARB. 172 (1977); Pieter
Sanders, Proceduresand Practicesunder the UNCITRAL Rules, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 453 (1979);
Terence Thompson, The UNCITRAL ArbitrationRules, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 141 (1976).
87.
See Jemej Sekolec, InternationalDispute Resolution: Areas Where FurtherResearch
May Be Useful, 20 J. INT'L ARB. 35 (2003).
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has fulfilled its objective in an increasing number of national jurisdictions .
It was designed to provide States with a highly advanced statutory
framework of arbitration law-in effect, to make it possible, especially for
developing States, to become instantly supportive of arbitration and thereby
able to participate in transborder commerce. 9 Numerous Latin American
jurisdictions 9° have adopted the Model Law as has Germany 9' and nearly
twenty U.S. states. 92 The UNCITRAL framework, with the recent
publication of the Model Law on International Conciliation, establishes a
self-contained system of international commercial dispute resolution. It is an
architecture of law that transcends national and regional differences and
codifies a truly global approach to international commercial dispute
resolution. While the system is not without its flaws and idiosyncracies, 93
and even has some noticeable disabilities,94 it nevertheless has significantly
advanced international uniformity and unity in matters of arbitration.
IV. THE ARBITRAL LEGAL CULTURE
As with other developments in private international law, arbitration law
relies heavily upon contract principles to establish its content. In fact, freedom of contract (pacta sunt servanda)95 is instrumental to the law of
88.
See, e.g., Richard B. Potter, The Coming ofAge of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Canada, 24 CANADIAN Bus. L.J. 429 (1995); Xavier E. Romeu-Matta, New Developments in
International Commercial Arbitration: a Comparative Survey of New State Statutes and the
UNCITRAL Model Law, I AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 140 (1990); David St. John Sutton, Hong Kong
Enacts the UNCITRAL Model Law, 6 ARB. INT'L 358 (1990); Frank-Bernd Weigand, The
UNCITRAL Model Law: New Draft ArbitrationActs in Germany and Sweden, 11 ARB. INT'L 397
(1995); Zhang Yulin, Towards the UNCITRAL Model Law--a ChinesePerspective, 11 J. INT'L ARB.
87 (1994); Ivan S. Zykin, The UNCITRAL Model Law on InternationalCommercialArbitration:
the Russian Experience, 9 ANN. DE LA HAYE DROIT INT'L 21 (1996).
89.
See, e.g., Gerold Herrmann, The UNCITRAL Model Law-Its Background,Salient Features, andPurposes, 1 ARB. INT'L 6 (1985); J. Martin H. Hunter, The UNCITRAL Model Law, 13
INT'L Bus. LAW. 399 (1985).
90.
See generally GARRO, supra note 78.
91.
See Klaus P. Berger, The Implementation of the UNCITRAL Model Law in Germany, 13
MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. 38 (1998).
92.
See, e.g., Vratislav Pechota, UNCITRALArbitration Rules, in 3 HANS SMIT & VRATSLAV
PECHOTA, WORLD ARBITRATION REPORTER 3083 (1986).
93.
See Francis Higgins, William Brown, & Patrick Roach, Pitfalls in InternationalCommercialArbitration,35 Bus. LAW. 1035 (1980).
94.
See C. Chatterjee, Bias in Arbitratorsand BiasAgainstArbitrators?,3 J. WORLD INVEST.
369 (2002); Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: a "Second Look" at
InternationalCommercialArbitration,93 Nw. U. L. REV. 453 (1999); Saul Perloff, The Ties That
Bind: the Limit ofAutonomy and Uniformity in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 13 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. 323 (1992). See also KATHERINE LYNCH, THE FORCES OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2003).
95.
See Karl-Heinz B6ckstiegel, The Role of PartyAutonomy in InternationalArbitration,
DIsP. RES. J. 24 (Summer 1997); C. Chattejee, The Reality of the PartyAutonomy Rule in International Arbitration, J. INT'L ARB. 539 (Dec. 2003); Douglas Jones, Arbitration and Party
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96
arbitration.
Parties must agree to submit their disputes to arbitration; once
they have entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate, they must go to arbitration (unless they mutually rescind or disavow the agreement).97 The parties
have the contractual right to forgo judicial relief at the time of entering into
the contract and prior to the emergence of a dispute.98 Also, modem laws on
arbitration provide for the presumptive enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards. 9 The parties' decision to arbitrate is not subject to
unilateral reconsideration and courts must uphold awards unless they transgress fundamental faimess.' °° In any event, the substance of the arbitral
ruling cannot be revisited or revised by a court.'0 ' The controlling legislation
requires courts to cooperate with and sustain the arbitral process. Actual
court supervision of the procedures and results is extremely circumscribed.
As stated recently by the U.S. Supreme Court in a landmark opinion, 0 2once
the courts find an enforceable contract of arbitration, the arbitrator assumes
decisional03sovereignty over the process and the eventual substantive deter-

mination.

A good portion of the content of the world law on arbitration is settlede.g., the application of separability'M and kompetenz-kompetenz doctrines, °5
the use of the setting aside procedure °6 at the place of arbitration, and the
effect of the functus officio doctrine.' 7 Parts of the law, however, are still in
evolution, indicating that the regulation of arbitration is dynamic and in-themaking. Altering the law and developing new rules revitalize both the law
and the arbitral process. Dynamic evolution avoids stagnation and obsolescence. For instance, two issues of contemporary arbitration law challenge the
foundational principles of the process and demonstrate its need for an ability
to adapt: arbitrator neutrality and the contractual right to modify the statutory
standards of arbitral awards.

Autonomy-How Free Is the Choice to Arbitrate?, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE 121
(Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwelled., 1997); Pierre A. Karrer &Anne-C. Imhoff, L'autonomiede la
volonte dans L 'arbitrageinternationalen Suisse: portieet limites spdcifiques, 1997 INT'L Bus. L.
J. 353.
96.
See, e.g., Johannes Trappe, The ArbitrationProceedings-Fundamental
Principlesand
Rights of Parties,J. INT'L ARB. 93 (Sept. 1998).
97.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 68, at 59, 92.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 92, 108, 297.
100.
Id. at 297.
101.
Id.
102.
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003); see alsoHowsam v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
103.
Id.
104.
For a discussion of this concept, see CARBONNEAU, supra note 68, at 29.
105.
Id.
106.
Id. at 348.
107.
Id. at 304.
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First, the topic of arbitrator neutrality has generated recent debate.' The
central focus has been on the impartiality of party-designated arbitrators.
Should party-appointed arbitrators be required or presumed to be neutral?
How should arbitrator neutrality be achieved? If by a duty of disclosure, how
far should the duty extend? Arbitrator neutrality clearly affects the legitimacy of arbitration as an adjudicatory mechanism.'0 9

Second, there is discussion among courts and commentators about
whether parties have the contractual right to modify the statutory standards
by which arbitral awards are confirmed, vacated, nullified, or set aside." In
particular, can parties require the court of enforcement to review an award on
the merits despite the prohibition against merits review in the applicable
statute? Courts and commentators are divided on the question."' Nonetheless, it tests the contractual foundation of arbitration by challenging the
effectiveness of the principle of freedom of contract.
The rule of law in transborder arbitration is influenced to a considerable
degree by private arbitral institutions. The most prominent among them include: The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC);"2 the London Court
of International Arbitration (LCIA);" 3 the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce

and the Institute of Arbitration;' " the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators;" 5 the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO); 1 6 the American Arbitration Association (AAA);" 7 and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF)." 8 A
number of these institutions spearheaded the developments relating to arbitrator neutrality and have been vigilant about maintaining the fairness of
arbitral procedures and the legitimacy of the process. These serviceproviders and other organizations also developed the practice of fast-track
108.
See MARC HENRY, LE DEVOIR D' INDEPENDENCE DE L'ARBITRE (2001); James H. Carter,
Improving Life with the Party-AppointedArbitrator:ClearerConduct Guidelinesfor 'Nonneutrals',
11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 295 (2000); Gavan Griffith, ConstitutionofArbitralTribunals: The Duty of
Impartialityin Tribunalsor Choose YourArbitratorWisely, 13 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT
L.J. 36 (1998); Lee Korland, What an ArbitratorShould Investigateand Disclose:Proposinga New
Testfor Evident PartialityUnder the FederalArbitrationAct, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 815 (2003);
Mark W. Levine, The Immunity ofArbitratorsand the Duty to Disclose, 6 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 197
(1995).
109.
See Alan Rau, On Integrity in PrivateJudging, 14 ARB. INT'L 115 (1998).
110.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 68, at 167-77.
111.
See Hans Smit, ContractualModification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral
Awards, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 147, 147-49 (1997); Victoria L.C. Holstein, Co-Optingthe Federal
Judiciary: ContractualExpansion ofJudicialReview ofArbitralAwards, I J. AM. ARB. 127 (2002);
Alan Rau, "Arbitrability" and JudicialReview: A Brief Rejoinder, 1 J. AM. ARB. 159 (2002).
112.
See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION - AN INTERNATIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY, supranote 73, at
§ 3.05.
113.
Id. at § 4.09.
114.
Id. at § 4.03.
115.
Id. at § 3.10, § 4.12.
116.
Id. at § 3.09.
117.
Id. at § 4.02.
118.
Id. at § 3.10, §4.12.
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arbitration" 9 in order to respond more fully to the needs of the users of the
arbitral process. Fast-track
•
20 procedures, developed initially by a prominent
law professor-arbitrator, attribute greater powers to the arbitrator and use
time constraints to maximize the efficiency of arbitral proceedings. Arbitral
institutions have also integrated mediation into the menu of services that are
offered to respond more effectively to actual client needs. 2' Finally, these
organizations supervise arbitral proceures 2to maintain their functionality,
fairness, and finality.
Arbitration has generated an impressive quantity of statutes and judicial
opinions. Law-making, therefore, surrounds arbitration and is relatively uniform. A parallel question is whether arbitrators themselves make law. In
other words: Is arbitration simply the subject of law, or is it also a source of
law? Do modem-day arbitrators fashion a commercial, antitrust, employment, maritime, securities, and contract law? Or, do they merely decide the
submitted cases on an ad hoc basis?
V. THE ARBITRAL LEX MERCATORIA

At the transborder level, there is a definite ambition to establish or discover an international commercial law or law of international commercial
contracts. "' There are already a number of aspirants. The CISG,' 24 for example, was intended to act as a U.C.C. for international transactions; if ratified
by the host country, it applies to the transaction automatically unless the parties expressly exclude it.' 25 The UNIDROIT has drafted a set of Principles on

119.
See John Ballen, Fast-TrackArbitration on the InternationalScene, 2 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 152 (1991); Benjamin G. Davis, Improving InternationalArbitration:the Needfor Speed and
Trust, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LIBER AMICORUM MICHEL GAUDET 28 (Benjamin G. Davis ed., 2000).
120.
See Hans Smit, Fast-TrackArbitration, 2 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 138 (1991).
121.
See CHRISTIAN BUHRING, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL

BUSINESS:

DESIGNING PROCEDURES FOR EFFECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (1996); EILEEN CARROLL &

KARL J. MACKIE, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION-THE ART OF BUSINESS DIPLOMACY (2000); Klaus

Peter Berger, Integrationof MediationElements into Arbitration: 'Hybrid'Proceduresand 'Intuitive' Mediation by International Arbitrators, 19 ARB. INT'L 387 (2003); Steven J. Burton,
Combining Conciliation with Arbitration in InternationalCommercial Disputes, 18 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 637 (1995); Emilia Onyema, The Use of Med-Arb in InternationalCommercial DisputeResolution, 12 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 411 (2001); David W. Plant, TheArbitratorAs
Settlement Facilitator,17 J. INT'L ARB. 143 (2000).
122.
See Paul J. Davidson, The InternationalFederationof CommercialArbitrationInstitutions, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 131 (1988).
123.
See text supra note 81.
124.
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG),
April 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf 97/18, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, 19 I.L.M. 671.
125.
See id.; see also COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW (Massimo C. Bianca & Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987).
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International Commercial Contracts (Principles)."'' 6 The proponents of The
Principles argue that it could serve as a transborder law of contracts and
should govern in litigations involving international commercial transactions.' 27 Finally, English courts and legislators might argue, from a more
traditional choice-of-law perspective, that English commercial law has bethat it
come so stable and sophisticated after years of judicial construction
121
mercatoria.
lex
transborder
the
as
function
could readily
There are at least two other views on the question of whether a transborder commercial law is emerging and how arbitrators participate in fashioning
it. First, pursuant to consecrated contract principles, the parties choose the
governing law in the contract. Courts must respect the parties' choice of law
unless it violates the jurisdiction's public policy.129 In each case, the transborder commercial law can be the law chosen by the parties. Second, the
designated arbitrators can also influence the selection of the law applicable.
For example, in the event that the parties fail to exercise their contract prerogative, the designated arbitrators would determine the matter because, at
this stage of the process, the parties are unlikely to agree and, therefore, must
cede their authority to the arbitrators who-in any event-are responsible for
the proper conduct of the arbitration. 30 Under standard institutional rules, the
arbitrators can use any choice-of-law formula they deem suitable to choose
the applicable law. Further, whichever law they choose, they must apply it in
conformity with customary trade usages.' 3' Accordingly, in some cases, the
transborder commercial law will be the law chosen by the arbitrators when
the parties default on the choice-of-law but the construction of that law must
be in conformity with standard commercial practices. Therefore, assuming
the fealty of the arbitrators' interpretation, the mercantile community ultimately sets the rule of law.
Given the contemporary sophistication of international business, it is
unlikely that parties would fail to exercise their right to choose the governing
law. Even systematic party choice, however, does not eliminate the arbitrators' influence. They retain the authority to mold the chosen law to the
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW
126.
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994).

(UNIDROIT),

See Michael Joachim Bonell, UnidroitPrinciplesand the LexMercatoria,in LEX MER249 (Thomas E.
Carbonneau ed., 1998).
See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codificationin the Common-Law World, 25
128.
YALE J. INT'L L. 435 (2000); Mark Garavaglia, In Search of the Proper Law in Transnational
Commercial Disputes, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 29 (1991).
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 68, at 23.
129.
Id. at 6-13.
130.
See Yves Derains, Le statut des usages du commerce internationaldevant lesjurisdic131.
tions arbitrales,in REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 122 (1973); Philippe Fouchard, Les usages, l'arbitreet
lajuge, in LE DROIT DES RELATIONS ECONOMIQUES INTERNATIONALES: ETUDES OFFERTES A BERTHOLD GOLDMAN 67 (Philippe Fouchard et al. eds., 1982).
127.

CATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT
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specific circumstances of the litigation. They must also generally interpret
the law and determine what it says. As members of the business community,
arbitrator can hardly ignore generally accepted practices. The content of the
governing lex, however chosen, is quite malleable then, with the degree of
malleability being determined by the arbitrator's ingenuity. 12 It is difficult to
escape the fact that arbitrators are hired for their expertise, business acumen,
and judgment. On a case-by-case basis, they invest the governing law with
content. In a word, arbitrators make law in the matters in which they sit.
They also can make law beyond the individual case. A process of stare
decisis has emerged regarding transborder arbitral awards.' Although arbitral awards are private and can consist primarily of factual determinations,
they have served as official or unofficial precedent in subsequent arbitrations. They have been used as a vehicle for establishing, modifying, or
contradicting the content of the governing law. Arbitrators can refer to determinations they reached in other arbitrations or rely upon awards rendered
by other arbitrators. Ruling arbitrators may seek to decide in a manner that is
in keeping with other arbitral rulings, thereby contributing to the establishment of a set of core commercial law principles of wide application. This
objective may require that they take liberties with the governing law and
their adjudicatory powers under the contract. Arbitrators bear primary responsibility to decide the submitted matter, but they also operate within a
larger adjudicatory system.3 4 The arbitrators' decisional sovereignty may be
restricted by an unstated, perhaps unrecognized, obligation to decide in conformity with the general principles of law that have arisen in other
arbitrations. The parties' reference to arbitration implies their acquiescence
to a system of arbitral adjudication beyond the bargain for the business
judgment of the arbitrators. At the transborder level, arbitrators may make
law both for the appointing parties and for the system in which they function.
The practice of the Court of Sports Arbitration (CSA) 3 5 confirms the
law-making activity of arbitrators. The CSA implements the regulations that
pertain to the training and competition of amateur athletes. It publishes its
132.
See, e.g., Otto Sandrock, How Much Freedom Should an InternationalArbitratorEnjoy?-the Desirefor Freedomfrom Law v. the PromotionofInternationalArbitration,3 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 30 (1992).

133.

See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Remaking ofArbitration:Design and Destiny, in

LEX MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION: A DISCUSSION OF THE NEW LAW MERCHANT, supra note

127, at 23.
134.
See, e.g., The Status of the Arbitrator,in THE ICC INTERNATIONAL COURT OFARBITRATION BULLETIN (Supp. Dec. 1995); Werner Melis, Function and Responsibility of Arbitral
Institutions, 13 COMP. L. Y.B. INT'L BUS. 107 (1991); D. J. Sharp, The Arbitrator'sDuty of Good
Faith, 66 ARBITRATION 226, 228-29 (2000); Murray L. Smith, ContractualObligationsOwed by
and to Arbitrator:Model Terms ofAppointment, 8 ARB. INT'L 17 (1992).
135.
See, e.g., GABRIELLE KAUFMANN-KOHLER, ARBITRATION AT THE OLYMPICS: ISSUES OF
FAST-TRACK DISPUTE RESOLUTION & SPORTS LAW (2001).
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opinions. Its activities and determinations have been the subject of commentary and evaluation. Its rulings are seen as having substantial prospective
value. Similarly, ICC arbitral awards have long been characterized as having
precedential impact. 6 Even within the• U.S.37 legal process,
arbitration has
3
become a critical remedy in employment,' securities,' and consumer
matters. A perusal of recent employment arbitration awards'40 revealed that
the vast majority of the awards are purely factual determinations. A small
percentage reflect summary dispositions. Approximately twenty percent of
the awards are mixed determinations; they contain factual determinations but
also include brief, episodic, and relatively inconsequential references to and
discussions of the applicable law. About seven percent of the awards are the
equivalent of substantial judicial opinions on employment law. These awards
warrant commentary and analysis and could have a precedential effect (in
the sense that they could influence another arbitrator's appraisal of law or
could be integrated into the adversarial dialogue about the meaning of the
governing law).
The essential point is simply stated: Even though an adjudicatory process is private in character, if it applies broadly in an area of activity, it
eventually yields substantive results that have a systemic character. A procedural system for the adjudication of claims cannot long function without
developing an overt and system-wide discussion of applicable decisional
predicates. The airing and molding of principles are necessary to the consistency and even-handedness (and, therefore, the legitimacy) of the process.
Where arbitration serves as the principal process of dispute resolution, arbitrators make law both inside and outside national legal systems.
As a result, the law's intersection with the process of arbitration is
of historical significance.4' Arbitration is no longer relegated to specialty
fields; it is becoming the primary process of civil litigation within
the United States.' 42 It also absorbs regulatory and statutory
.

.139

136.
Id.
137.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 68, at 251.
138.
Id. at 210.
139.
Id. at 225.
140.
The awards can be classified in four rubrics: Class One awards consist of arbitral rulings
that have an evident precedential value in light of the sophistication of the legal reasoning and the
application of the law to the facts of the matter. Class Two awards are determinations that are likely
to be important in guiding other arbitrators in reaching their conclusions on the basis of law. Legal
discussion is present in these awards and the law is applied to the findings of fact. Class Three
awards represent determinations reached exclusively on the basis of facts. These awards are wellcrafted and composed-they are entirely professional and rigorous-but they do not contain any
discussion of law. Finally, Class Four awards are summary dispositions of the matters presented. In
the classification, each award is introduced by a headnote and a brief summary of the facts and, if
relevant, a discussion of the law. The awards are on deposit with the author.
141.
See CARBONNEAU, supra note 68, at 1.
142.
Id. at 57-77.
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claims.14 Furthermore, it provides transborder merchants with a stable process of adjudication and is beginning to fashion--or at least to participate in
the making of-an international law of commerce and international contracts.'" Arbitration, therefore, fills gaps, supplies access to adjudication, and
develops workable substantive norms for transnational commerce and the
central subject areas of domestic civil litigation. NAFTA arbitration4 1 is particularly promising in terms of law-making. It has tremendous transnational
potential because of its scope and its anchor in regulatory and treaty law.
Throughout the field of arbitration, practical imperatives and the need for
functionality outweigh the controversial inconsistencies of diversity.
VI. PROSPECTIVE ARBITRAL PRACTICE
The international and domestic significance of arbitration may call for a
new form of public regulation of the arbitral process and of arbitrators. Arguing that courts should review awards on the merits because they may have
acquired a systemic law-making capacity is a perilous position to take. The
historical liberation of arbitration was achieved by limiting the judicial scrutiny of awards to whether the procedure giving rise to the arbitrator's
determination was fundamentally fair and whether arbitrators remained
46
within the contractual boundaries of their authority in rendering awards.'
Even if the merits review of awards became essential, vacatur on this basis
should be confined to the arbitrator's denaturing of the governing law. 47 A
similar standard should apply even in domestic arbitrations involving civil
rights claims. In order to preserve the functionality of the arbitral process, it
seems that society must trust the arbitrator to reach the "right" or a plausible
conclusion-or, at least, not to settle on a profoundly repugnant determination. Engaging in postfacto supervision directed exclusively at the content of
awards does not respond well to the need to protect disputing parties from
arbitrator abuse.
The regulation of arbitral law-making, it seems, must be centered upon
the arbitrators themselves and must take place at the head of the process.
Given the arbitrators' potential law-making role, some form of certification
or licensure should be established and satisfied prior to appointment. Because the arbitrator is asked to perform the function of a judge and the
rendered award can have an impact beyond the particular transaction, the
143.
Id. at 177.
144.
Id. at 354-68.
145.
See text supra notes 69-72.
146.
See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) § 10,9 U.S.C. § 1; New York Arbitration Convention, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, at art. V.
147.
Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitrationand the U.S. Supreme Court: a Pleafor Statutory
Reform, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 231 (1990).
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arbitrator becomes a type of public figure exercising a quasi-public mandate.
Even when the arbitrator merely decides the submitted matter, the arbitrator
acts in a professional capacity and should be subject to some form of regulation beyond the private contract. The importance of judging demands the
imposition and fulfillment of minimal professional requirements.
The desirability and exact character of the credentialing process need to
be discussed. 48 That discussion exceeds the scope of the present writing.
Suffice it to state that it seems that the cottage industry character of international commercial arbitration may no longer be a sufficient framework for
operating the transborder arbitral process. The growth and development of
the process demand greater transparency and access. Clients should be able
to know readily how to choose their arbitrators. Individuals who seek to
serve as arbitrators should be able to discover how they might enter the
process. It may well be the case that the basic rationale for hiring someone
as an arbitrator will never change. Parties choose arbitrators because of their
experience and demonstrated judgment in a particular commercial field; credentials rarely overwhelm the reality and necessity of experience. It also
would be difficult to justify a situation in which the parties could be prevented from appointing the person they want as arbitrator because of a
failure of credentials, although the movement toward fully neutral party arbitrators at least points in that direction. Be that as it may, if the possible lawmaking function of arbitrators justifies requiring credentials, the certifying
process cannot become a perfunctory exercise. Requiring meaningless credentials would defraud the process and all of the affected parties.
The need for external scrutiny and approval of arbitrators is especially
strong in domestic employment or consumer arbitrations that involve the
application of civil rights laws or other fundamental social policy regulations. In these circumstances, the professionalism of the arbitrator and the
composition of the tribunal can have a direct bearing upon the acceptability
of the result. Arbitrators who lean either way on the political issues that are
raised should be excluded from the process. However meritorious their
grievances, it is difficult to accept the position of African-Americans and
women that the seated arbitral tribunal should include an arbitrator who favors
their position or that the majority of the tribunal be sympathetic to their political convictions.' 49 If partisan arbitrators favoring civil rights must be appointed
in cases involving allegations of civil rights violations in the workplace, it
might require the designation of a "racist" arbitrator in a three-member tribunal. Such a circumstance would be untenable for the administrating institution
148.
See, e.g., Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: PrivateArbitration
and the Needfor Public Oversight ofArbitration,87 IowA L. REV. 1337 (2002).
149.
This is the arbitral device that was used in the settlement of the discrimination suit
against Smith Barney and in a similar suit against Merrill Lynch. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 561 (3d ed. 2002).
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and would undermine the legitimacy of the proceedings and the arbitral
process. In matters involving divisive political issues, the appointment of a
three-member panel seems necessary simply to accommodate the range of
possible views. Perhaps the parties should have a nearly absolute right to
appoint "their" arbitrator, provided full disclosure is made on specified relevant matters. Disclosure should avoid vacatur of the award because of the
"evident partiality" of the arbitrator. The administering institution should
present the two party-appointed arbitrators with a slate of three "acceptable"
candidates for the position of chair. The listing can indicate the administering institution's order of preference for the neutral arbitrator. If the two
arbitrators and the appointing parties are unable to agree on a single choice
within a reasonable period of time, the administering institution should designate its first preference as the chair. The appointment can be subject to
immediate judicial review for clear abuse of discretion.
Although they remain controversial, the public law issues are nowhere
near as divisive in international arbitrations, in which the need for external
scrutiny and the application of external standards are much less. Although
"reparations" are not the issue, a variety of "reconciliations" need to take
place in light of the diversity of the international community. The international arbitrator needs to have an awareness of the global geo-political
divisions (North-South, East-West), the positions on trade policy, and the
national legal traditions that constitute the rule of law. The international arbitrator should not only be a commercial expert and player, but also a historian
of the international community and knowledgeable about its current developments. The international arbitrator should also have the multi-cultural and
multi-linguistic experience necessary to understand transborder cultural and
sociological differences. The challenge of elaborating necessary credentials
for international arbitrators may best be left to the ad hoc decision-making of
the contracting parties and their lawyers, but it is clear that the international
arbitrator plays a significant role in bridging the diverse groups and practices
of the international community. In the end, the harmonization of the diverse
practices and cultural dispositions of national legal systems will take place in
the mind of the arbitrator.

